CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Background to the study
The
unique role of banks as engine of growth in any economy has been widely
acknowledged. Banks occupy central position in the country’s financial system
and are essential agents in the development process. The intermediation role of
banks can be said to be a catalyst for economic growth as investment funds are
mobilized from the surplus units in the economy and made available to the
deficit units. By intermediating between the surplus and deficit units within
an economy, banks mobilize and facilitate efficient allocation of national
savings, thereby increasing the quantum of investments and hence national
output. Banks as financial intermediaries provide avenue for people to save
incomes not expended on consumption. It is from the savings accumulated that
they extended credit facilities to the entire economy. To perform their role
effectively deposit money banks (DMBs) have to be adequately liquid. This
implies that the survival of deposit money banks depends largely on its
liquidity, because illiquidity being a sign of imminent distress can easily
erode the confidence of the public in the banking sector hence sound liquidity
is inevitable.
Liquidity management helps deposit money banks to maintain
stability in operations and earnings by serving as a guide to investment
portfolio packaging. Effective liquidity management serves as a veritable tool
through which deposit money banks maintain the statutory requirements of the
central bank as it affects the proportion of deposits to liquid assets and
deposits to loans and advances. Liquidity management reduces the incidence of
bankruptcy and liquidation which can be the later effect of illiquidity, and
help them to achieve some margin of safety for their customers’ deposits.
Adequate liquidity helps banks to sustain public confidence of the depositors
and the financial markets. Liquidity management assists banks in trading off
between risk and return; and liquidity and profitability. It serves as a tool
through which deposit money banks avoid over liquidity and under liquidity and
their consequences. It also enables the banks to avoid forced sales of
unfavourable and unprofitable venture or its assets to generate cash. It
is for this reason; governments of countries through their apex bank and other
relevant authorities formulate reform policies and programme for banking
industry (Olagunju, Adeyanju, and Olabode 2011).
The
importance of accurate liquidity management cannot be over stressed as it
reveals the liquidity positions of the banks through which the operators of the
financial market and other creditors adjudged the credit worthiness of the
banks. Liquidity management requires an appraisal of
holdings of assets that may be turned into cash. The determination of liquidity
adequacy within this framework requires a comparison of holding of liquid
assets with expected liquidity needs. The
stock concept of liquidity management is widely used and involves the
application of financial ratios in the measurement of liquidity positions of
deposit money banks. One of the financial ratios used in such measurement is
liquidity ratios which measures the ability of the bank to meet its current
obligations. Other ratios which have been developed to measure liquidity are
liquid assets to total assets; liquid assets to total deposits; loans and
advances to deposits. Calculating the ratio of liquid assets to total assets
explains the importance of a bank’s liquid assets among its total assets. It
indicates the proportion of a bank’s total assets that can be converted into
cash at a short notice. Cash ratio to total deposits or assets is another
measure of bank liquidity. Its advantage over others is that liquid assets are
related directly to deposits rather than to loans and advances that constitute
the most illiquid of banks assets. The
ratios serves as a useful planning and control tool in liquidity management
since deposit money banks use it as a guide to extend credit to the economy (
Olagunju, Adeyanju , Olabode 2011).
In
an attempt to enhance adequate liquidity the Nigerian government through the
monetary authorities have implemented various policies reforms and regulations
in banking sector. Such policies and regulations include: The introduction of
the 1952 Banking Ordinance which imposed entry conditions for banks in Nigeria.
For the first time, indigenous banks were required to have a minimum paid-up
capital of £12,500 while foreign banks were required to have a minimum paid-up
capital of £100,000. Banks were also required to maintain a reserve into which
a minimum of 20 percent of their annual profits had to be paid. The 1952
Banking Ordinance was however ineffective in managing banking liquidity
(Nwankwo 1980).
The
1952 Banking Ordinance did not make any provision for assisting banks as there
was no Central Bank to act as lender of last resort. The Banking Ordinance of
1958 was subsequently enacted, establishing the Central Bank of Nigeria. The
1958 Banking Ordinance raised the minimum statutory reserve from 20 percent to
25 percent of annual profits; maximum lending to 20 percent of the sum of
paid-up capital and statutory reserves; and specified a list of acceptable
liquid assets. The 1958 Banking Ordinance was amended in 1962; the amendment
raised the minimum paid-up capital of indigenous banks from £12,500 to £250,000
while foreign banks were required to maintain a minimum of £250,000 worth of
banks assets (Ajayi and Ojo 1981).
The
1958 Banking Ordinance and its 1962 amendment were repealed in 1969 and
replaced by the Banking Act of 1969. The Banking Act of 1969 empowered the CBN
to stipulate minimum holding by banks of cash reserves, specified liquid
assets, special deposits and stabilization securities. The maximum lending to a
single borrower was also increased from 20 percent to 33.3 percent of the
paid-up capital and statutory reserves.
IMF
supported Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) was introduced in 1986 in order
to encourage competition and market led resource allocation. NCEMA (2003)
explain that SAP “relies on market forces and the private sector in dealing
with the fundamental problems of the economy.” The package of financial reforms
introduced during this period led directly to an increase in deposit money
banks from 40, before 1986, to 120 in 1992. In 1990, entry into the Nigerian
Banking Sector was further liberalized as foreign banks were allowed to open
offices in the country. CBN Decree 24 and the Banks and Other Financial
Institutions Decree 25 both of 1991, which repealed the Banking Decree 1969 and
all its amendments were thereafter enacted to strengthen the power of CBN to
cover new institutions in order to enhance the effectiveness of monetary
policy. By 1998, however, the number of deposit money banks in operation
whittled down to 89 when the monetary authorities liquidate thirty (30)
terminally distressed deposit money banks.
In
addition, other frantic efforts were made to enable
banks to perform optimally. These include the establishment of the Nigerian
Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC); Banks
and Other Financial Institutions Act (BOFIA) No. 25 of 1991; and the introduction of Prudential Guidelines in
strengthening the regulatory and supervisory institutions. The Removal of Credit Ceilings and
upward review of capital adequacy standards were also enacted. Also, the introduction of Prudential Guidelines in
1990, increased minimum paid-up capital requirements of deposit money banks
from N20 million to N50 million in 1992, N50million to N500 million in 1998 and N500 million to N2 billion in 2002. For banks to
become stronger in liquidity, perform better, become more competitive and
contribute to the Nigerian economy and attain a global standard, the “mother”
of reforms was carried out in 2004. The minimum paid-up capital for deposit
money banks was increased from N2 billion to N25 billion (Iganiga, 2010).
The
relationship between liquidity management and deposit money banks’ performance
is on the notion that well articulated liquidity management in banking industry
will improve deposit money banks’ performance. This will in no small measure
improve the asset base of deposit money banks and make more credit available to
the economy.
1.2 Statement of the Problem
The
relevance and the need for liquidity management became clearer in Nigeria when
the country witnessed crises in the banking sector, leading to costly bank
failures. The Nigerian banking sector suffered inadequate liquidity which led
to series of bank failures, and subsequent policy measures. The first took
place in the late 1930s and early 1950s mainly due to lack of liquidity
management policy and poor asset quality. In fact, 21 of the 25 indigenous
banks which had been established in the country by 1954 failed (Okigbo, 1951).
The challenges of inefficient liquidity management in banks were also witnessed
during the liquidation and distress era of 1980s and 1990s. The negative
cumulative effects of banking system liquidity crisis from the 1980s and 1990s
lingered up to the re-capitalization era in 2005 and the 2009 post recapitalization.
The
intervention of Government in the banking sector to resolve distress crises led
to the various reform programme and policies. Such as the Banking Act of 1969
and the establishment of Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC) in 1988
and liberalization policy in 1986 which re-introduced banks with foreign
equity. Systematic distress resurfaced in the Nigerian banking industry again
between 1989 and 1998 leading to a number of distress syndromes. The alarming
rate of distress scourge in the banking sector between 1997 and 2003 gave birth
to the banking sector reform of July 6, 2004 of which consolidation is one of
the 13 point reform agenda (Hamman, 2004). The Central Bank of Nigeria requested all
deposit banks to raise their minimum capital base from about US$15 million to
US$192 million by the end of 2005. In the process of meeting the new capital
requirements, banks raised the equivalent of about $3 billion from domestic
capital markets and attracted about $652 million of FDI into the Nigerian
banking sector.
Barely
five years of what was applauded and considered as a fortified repositioning of
banks against liquidity shortage. The
global financial crisis of 2008 also had its claws on the banking sector as
several banks remain relatively fragile and incapable of withstanding periodic
liquidity shocks .Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) in 2009 came on a rescue
mission to bailout nine (9) out of the twenty four (24) banks with the sum of
N620 billion to prevent the occurrence of distress in the industry as some
banks had seriously exhibited varying symptoms of distress. The action of the
CBN became imperative because the balance sheet of the affected banks had
shrunken, their shareholders funds impaired and they had liquidity problem.
During the period from December 2008 to December 2009, Nigerian banks wrote off
loans equivalent to 66% of their total capital; most of these write offs
occurred in the eight banks receiving loans from the CBN. Most of the banks
also suffered panic runs and flights to safety during the period (Sanusi,
2009). This development is yet another indication of poor liquidity management
which led to poor credit creation in the economy.
According
to Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) 2005 annual report, total credit to GDP ratio fell
from 49.8 percent in 2004 to 45.0 percent in 2005, this was in the face of
reduction in the minimum reserve requirement from 15 percent to 13 percent
during the period. Like any other developing countries, the ratio of credit to
GDP has not increased significantly. The quantity, quality, cost and
availability of loanable funds have continued to constrain the expansion of
businesses and self-employment which are effective channels of job creation due
to inconsistent liquidity management policy in the country.
Despite
the various policy efforts and the attempts to improve the performance of
deposit money banks in Nigeria, a look at the banking industry still showed
that the industry return on equity declined from 27.35% in 2004 to 10.6% in
2006, while return on asset declined from 3.12% to 1.61 within the same period.
Non-performing credits grew from N316 billion in 2004 to N357 billion in 2005
representing an average of N337 billion in the pre consolidation era. In the
post-consolidation era, it was N222 billion in 2006, N388 billion in 2007, N464
billion in 2008 and N620 billion in 2009 (Okafor 2012). By 2012, Industry
equity capital decreased by 14.45% from N220.21 billion in December 2011 to
N188.39 billion in 2012. Then reserves decreased marginally by 2.21% from N2,
266 billion in 2011 to N2, 216 billion in 2012. The industry total loans stood
at N8.15 trillion in 2012, an increase of 12.10% over the N7.27 trillion
reported in 2011. The industry recorded a profit-before-tax of N525.34 billion
in 2012, representing a significant improvement over the loss of N6.71 billion
reported in 2011. Non-interest income on the other hand dropped by 31.92% from
N845.66 billion to N575.75 billion (NDIC annual report, 2012).
In
addition, only 10 banks were declared sound, 63 satisfactory, 8 marginal and 9
unsound in 2001. However in 2002, there was an improvement. The number of sound
banks was 13, the satisfactory banks were 54, marginal were 13 and unsound were
10. The sound banks reduced to 11, the satisfactory banks were 53, and marginal
were 14 and the unsound banks reduced to 9 in 2003. After the consolidation
specifically in 2006 and 2007, the Sound banks were 4, Satisfactory 17, Marginal 2, and Unsound 1 (NDIC
annual report, 2011). The total credit was N2, 840.10 billion and N5, 250
billion respectively in 2006 and 2007. Also, the banks’ Non performing credit
was N225.08 billion and N387.99 billion; ratio of non-performing credit to
shareholders’ funds was 22.5 and 23.98; and Profit before tax was N181.04 billion
and N397.75 billion. The banks’ non-performing credits to total credit ratio
was as high as 88.35% with an average capital to risk weighted assets ratio of
11.74% (Cowry Research Desk,
2009).
It
was further revealed that there was a quantum leap in the proportion of
Reserves to total liabilities as it increased from 0.96% in 2010 to 10.35% in
2011. Total assets increased by 17.31% from N18.66 trillion in 2010 to N21.89
trillion in 2011 In 2012, all
the banks, except one met the stipulated minimum capital adequacy ratio (CAR)
of 10.0% and industry liquidity ratio at an average of 63.9% against the
prescribed minimum of 30.0%. The asset quality of banks improved substantially
as it declined to 3.47% at 2012 which was below the threshold of 5.0% (NDIC
annual report, 2011).
The foregoing underscores
the need to examine the impact of liquidity management on deposit money banks
performance in Nigeria. In light of this, several studies have been carried out
in Nigeria. Such studies include Agbada and Osuji
(2013), Ayodele, et al (2013), Ibe (2013),
Uremadu (2012), Adebayo et al (2011), Fadare (2011), Florence (2003), Yauri
(2012) Owolabi (2012) and Aremu (2011). Virtually all the works failed to
directly examine the impact of liquidity management on deposit money banks
performance in Nigeria at the macro level. The main focus has been on liquidity
management and banks profitability, and at the micro or firm level. Agbada and
Osuji (2013) who examined the relationship between liquidity management and
banks performance employed descriptive statistics and Pearson’s Product Moment
correlation analysis. This methodology has the drawback of not being able to
show the direction of cause and effect. Also, most of the studies, such as
Ayodele and Oke (2013), Ibe (2013) and Florence (2003) suffered
micronumerousity due to limited data points used in their works. This study
therefore examines the impact of liquidity management on performance of deposit
money banks in Nigeria with specific reference to banks asset and credit to the
economy.
1.3 Research Questions
This
study seeks to address the following research questions: