THE CONCEPT OF PAUL TAYLOR’S BIOCENTRIC ETHICS

TABLE OF CONTENT

Approval Page  —-  —-  —-  —–  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  — ii

Certification  —-  —-  —-  —-  —–  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —- iii

Dedication  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  – iv

Acknowledgements  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-   —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  — v

Abstract  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —- viii

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.  Background to the Study —- —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —–  —-  —-  —1
   1.  Statement of the Problem  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —- 3
   1.  Purpose of the Study  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  – 4
   1.  Scope of the Study  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-   4
   2.  Significance of the Study  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —  —-  –5 
   1.  Methodology  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —  —-  —- — 6

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW —-  —-  —-  —  —-  —-  —-  —-  —- 7

Endnotes  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —– 23

CHAPTER THREE: THE CONCEPT OF PAUL TAYLOR’S BIOCENTRIC ETHICS

3.1 Life and Biocentrism  —- –  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —- —-  —-  —-  —-  — 26

3.2 The Critique of Anthropocentric Ethics  —-  —-  —  —-  —-  —-  —-  — 29

3.3 The Attitude of Respect  —-  —  —-  —-  —  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  34

3.4 The Belief System  —-  —-  —–  —-  —  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-   39

3.5 The System of Rules and Standards  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  — 48

Endnotes  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-   55

CHAPTER FOUR: RESOLVING ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICTS

4.1 The Nature of these Conflict——  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —- 59

4.2 The Application of the Priority Principles —–  —-  —-  —-  —- –  61

4.3 The Ethics of Bioculture  —-  —-  —- –  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  71

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4.4 Ethical harmony between Humans and Nonhumans –  —  —-  – 73

Endnotes —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  – 76

CHAPTER FIVE: EVALUATION

5.1 Important Considerations on Taylor’s Biocentric Ethics —-  —-  —-  — 78

5.2 The Implications of Taylor’s Biocentric Ethics  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  – 79

5.3 Challenges to Taylor’s Ethics  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-   84

Summary And Conclusion  —-  —- —  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —  90

Endnotes  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-  —-     92

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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ABSTRACT

Ethics as an aspect of axiology has always existed strictly as a human affair. This had given rise to the conclusion that human centered ethics, in its conception and articulation is insufficient in the face of the present day environmental problem; since humans neither consider the natural world nor its wild living beings as entity worthy of moral consideration. With the three main components of Taylor’s  ethics, namely:  the belief- system, the attitude of respect for nature and the system of rules and principles, the study established the intelligibility and necessity of a life-centered theory of environmental ethics (which also is its main objective) against the prevailing anthropocentric  view. To attain the above stated goal, the work employed the historical and analytical methods, interpretation and argumentation to explore data sourced from books, journals and articles. The analyses of the work under discussion revealed the following: (i) that it is intelligible to conceive a life-centered theory of environmental ethics similar to human ethics, (ii) It is also a necessity because human ethics is insufficient in our present day environmental problems, (iii) human claim of superiority over nonhuman living beings could not be philosophically justified (iv) the nonhuman living beings of the natural world have inherent worth of their own, which does depend on their usage in furthering any human end. Despite the challenges and conflicts inherent in life-centered theory of environmental ethics, the study saw the possibility of adopting Taylor’s biocentric ethics as a means of solving the present day environmental problems and also articulating new environmental concern.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1. Background of the Study

In the course of my consideration on what to write on, I came across a book titled The Environmental Ethics Policy Book, edited by Donald Van Deveer and Christine Pierce, which belonged to my supervisor. Reading from the book the works of Peter Singer and Paul Taylor, on Animal Liberation and Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics respectively, I was relieved to discover that environmental issues have philosophical/ethical dimension. With the above discovery in mind, I was determined to seek the philosophical and ethical justification of humans in their unrestrained exploitation and abuse of the natural ecosystems. In this regard, therefore, I found Paul Taylor’s ethics of respect for nature in line, and appropriate for my considerations.

The three elements of Taylor’s concept of environmental ethics that attracted my concern were: the emphasis on Life itself as the prerequisite for moral consideration, the affirmation of the inherent worth instead of Right of living things, and the application of normative principles for fair resolution of conflicts. Thus, it is pertinent to state here that the above account led me into this research work.

          Paul Taylor’s concept of environmental ethics resulted from the call for a new ethics, which will account for our moral relation with the natural world. This call for a new ethics emerged when the recent degradation and destruction of the natural environment by various human activities attracted the attention and concern of philosophers. The root cause of man’s domination and destruction of the natural world was located in the tenet of the traditional ethical systems and was tagged Anthropocentrism because of its affirmation that only human beings deserve moral concern and consideration. The rejection of anthropocentrism or anthropocentric ethics paved way for the development of a new field in ethics known as Environmental Ethics or Environmental Philosophy – to evaluate our moral relation with the natural environment. The above analysis makes it logical that every development of a theory in environmental ethics must necessarily begin with the critique of anthropocentric ethics. Responding to this demand for a new ethics, some philosophers and moralists have conceived a new ethics as the mere extension of the traditional ethical theories such as teleological theory, Deontological theory and Utilitarian theory to sentient animals. The above view came to be known as extentionism, since the argument here is centred on extending human ethical theories to accommodate non-human animals. The proponents of the above view were concerned in the inclusion of animals in the sphere of morality.

         Seeing the inclusion of only sentient animals in the sphere of morality as narrow, another group of philosophers conceived a new ethics which broadens moral relevance and consideration to include whatever that possesses life. This view came to be known as biocentrism, which is translated from the Greek word bio – life, to mean life-centred ethics. There is yet the last group of environmental philosophers, who were radical in their articulations and views. They demand that moral relevance be widened to accommodate everything in the ecosystem directly and not indirectly. This view has been termed ecocentricism or holism.

         Paul Taylor’s concept of biocentric ethics as presented in his book Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics was developed by him as a rejection of anthropocentrism (which exalts human beings at the detriment of other living beings) and extensionism for being so narrow in its inclusion of only sentient beings in the sphere of moral relevance. In contrast to the above view, Taylor seeks an ethics that accommodates all living beings. His view is built upon the idea that all living being in the natural world has an inherent worth of their own which is derived from the fact that they are teleological centres of life, and with a good of their own. Hence, to respond to this life-centred ethics, as conceived by Taylor, humans must adopt an attitude of respect for nature.

1. Statement of the Problem

Ethics as an aspect of axiology has always existed strictly as a human affair. This conception, which has been tagged anthropocentrism, has consequently inspired the recent degradation and unhealthy exploitation of the natural world by various human activities, such as the destruction of the ecosystems, the disposal of dangerous substances into the sea or in open places, etc. The issue here is that humans neither consider the natural world nor its living wilds as entities worthy of moral concern and consideration. Thus, human centered ethics, in its conception and articulation is insufficient in the provision of moral guide on how well humans should relate with the natural world.   

In the light of Paul Taylor’s biocentric ethics therefore, this research work aspires to address the following research questions.

• What philosophical/ethical justifications do humans have for their unrestrained exploitation of the natural world?
• Do the natural world and all its wild living beings has any worth that deserve human considerations and respect?
• What sort of consideration and respect should humans express towards nature?
  • Purpose of the Study

 The general purpose of this work is to expose the argument on the intelligibility and necessity of a life-centered theory of environmental ethics according to Taylor’s conception and articulations, showing that human ethics is insufficient in solving the present day environmental crisis. One wants to insist that Taylor’s biocentric ethics has a lot of commendable appeal, which can provide a paradigm for the present day environmental demand and further articulation of environmental course.

1. Scope of the Study

This research work centres on Paul Taylor’s theory of environmental ethics as articulated in his book Respect for Nature: A theory of environmental ethics. For the sake of clarity and understanding of the topic under discussion, this work will, first, treat the concept of environmental ethics and its historical development. In pursuit of the work, only related and relevant works and ideas on environmental related issues, environmental ethics and philosophy in general will be use to evaluate the concept.

1. Significance of the Study

The research work establishes the necessity and possibility of a life-centred theory of environmental ethics against the prevailing anthropocentric view of our present day world, by rescuing nature from the sophisticated human civilization. Through the integration and the application of the priority principles, the study promises the possibility of attaining ethical balance and harmony in the domain of both human ethics and environmental ethics. Therefore, the work does not propose life-centred theory of environmental ethics as a substitute of human ethics, but as a supplement.

In academic research, no work is an end in itself. In line with the above assertion, the work is not an end in itself but a means to further ends. As an aspect of philosophy, it is meant to contribute to philosophy in general, and also to environmental ethics in particular, especially in the on-going debate of environmental theorists.

Finally, the work will be relevant in legal and political field for better environmental policy-making. Also, scientists of every field, especially those on the fields of environmental science and management, geography, botany and agriculture, will find the work useful in their research and analyses. In fact, every field of learning that is sincerely geared towards the preservation, restoration and improvement of life, in general, will find this research work useful.

1. Methodology

The research data for this work were sourced from books, journals and articles. The historical and analytical methods were used to explore the conception of nature in the various philosophical epochs. The methods of interpretation and argumentation were also used in the presentation of the work.