CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background of the
Study
The
history of local government system in Nigeria dates back to the colonial
days. Although contact with Europeans dates back to the fifteenth century, it
was not until 1861 before the first steps were taken to establish an
administration by Britain.
The colonial administration that was established was based on indirect rule.
This requires that the administration should be carried out through traditional
rulers and institutions. This led to the establishment of native authorities in
their most rudimentary forms from the 1980s to the 1930s. The main function of
the native authorities was to maintain law and order.
The
first native authority ordinance recognized traditional rulers as native
authorities. This was early done in Northern Nigeria
but there was a problem in identifying who those authorities were in southern Nigeria. This
necessitated the first reforms in the 1930s and the 1940s culminating in the
establishment of chiefs-in-council and chiefs-and-council in place of sole native
authorities. The chief-in-council is made up of the chief and members of
council. The chief presides at all meetings and acts in accordance with the
majority of opinion in the council. But if he disagrees with the council, he
would take whatever action he thought beat and inform the governor of the
region. Contrarily, in the chief-and-council, the chief has no power to act
against the decision or advice of the council. Under this arrangement, people
particularly representatives of missionaries and British trading interest were
appointed into the native authorities. The process of appointment of nominated
members by the colonial government meant that nationalists were not appointed
to serve on the councils. This led to further agitation for reforms in the
native authorities.
In
the years 1950-55, the first largely elected local government council based on
the British Westminster model emerged in Lagos and the former Eastern and
Western regions. Traditional rulers constituted not more than 25 percent of
most councils in the then Western regions and Lagos. However, in Northern
Nigeria, the changes were more gradual. The legal framework for
local government at this period was provided by the Eastern region local
government ordinance of 1950, the Western region local government law of 1952
and the 1954 native authority law in Northern Nigeria.
By this time, the councils were given a under range of functions including
primary education, health, police, judiciary etc. This is in line with the
implementation of the colonial government’s ten-year welfare and development
plan (1946-1956). The councils also enjoyed a great measure of autonomy in
financial, personnel and general administrative matters. It can therefore be
said that the 1950s was the era of pupilage for councils in modern local
government throughout Nigeria.
Between
1960-1966, there was a decline in the
prestige and responsibilities of local authorities. In the former western
region, the local government (Amendment) law 1960 abolished the powers of councils
to levy education and general rates on the basis of need. In Lagos, there was a high rate of default in
the payment of property rates including government institutions, which reduced
the revenue of the local councils. The situation in eastern Nigeria was
similar to the west before the outbreak of the civil was in 1967. In northern
Nigeria, there were gradual changes in the structure of the councils with
increasing numbers of elected or appointed non-traditional office holders
becoming members of local authorities. The result was that the local
authorities had a stable administration, which enabled them to assume responsibility,
with some degree of success for more complex services like primary education.
Between 1969-1971, some state government introduced some changes in the
structure of their councils.
For
the first time in the history of local government in Nigeria, a uniform system was
developed for the whole country. According to the then chief of staff Brigadier Shehu. M. Yar Adu’a in his forward
to the guidelines for local government reform (1976), in embarking on these
reforms, the federal military government was essentially motivated by the
necessity to stabilized and rationalize government at the local level. This
must of necessity entail the decentralization of some significant functions of
state governments to local levels in order to harness local resources for rapid
development.
Undoubtly,
the 1976 reforms conceptualized local
government as the third tier of government operating within a common
institutional framework with defined functions and responsibilities. To strengthen
the philosophy of the government, it went further to guarantee the statutory
nature of local government by embodying it in the 1979 constitution section 7
(1) of the said constitution stated:
The system of democratically elected local government council is under this constitution guaranteed.
As
the third tier of government, the local government gets statutory grants from
federal and state governments, and is expected to serve as agent of development
especially in rural areas. According to the 1976 reform 75 percent of members
of the council are to be elected through the secret ballot on a no-party basis
under the direct and indirect systems of election. The remaining 25 percent are
to be nominated by the state government. Following the reform the federal
government in 1977, allocated 5 percent of federally collected revenue to local
government.
Unfortunately
during the Alhaji Shehu Shagari regime (1979 – 1983) the constitutional
provisions of section seven of the 1979 constitution were neglected. No
elections were held and sole administrators were appointed. The Mohammadu
Buhari regime (1983 – 1984) continued with the system of sole administrators.
During Babangida regime (1984-1992) there were certain measures aimed at
ensuring local government autonomy. These include the abolition of the ministry
of local government; establishment of executive and legislative arms in local
councils; and direct allocation to local government without passing through
state government. The regime also increased local government statutory
allocation from 15 percent to 20 percent with effect from 1992. It is important
to point out that the intergovernmental relations between the federal, state
and local government has been characterized by both co-operation and conflict,
but it is conflict that has predominated state-local government relations. Some
state governments have been known to have hijacked and diverted federal
government’s allocation to local governments. This is why one of the features
of the reform during Ibrahim Babangida’s regime was to make allocations
directly to local governments without going through state.
Invariably,
the above cited provisions in the constitution would portend intractable inter-governmental
problems in which the local government is obvious the “whipping child”. All
these constitutional provisions are tantamount, in so far as local governments’
functional autonomy is concerned, to giving something with the right-hand and
taking it back with the left hand. Thus our values, sentiments and prejudices
could not escape intruding as we make the premise as well as suggest measures
for transforming Nigerian local government system.
1.2 Statement of the Problem
In the last few years there has been so much avoidable controversy and confusion about the local government system in Nigeria. Quite a number of challenges have confronted local governments in Nigeria, in their bid to utilize their autonomy in the task of developing the localities. These include structural, operational, financial, patron/godfather pressure, unstable democracy, constitutional provisions and corruption. However, this could be as a result of Nigeria’s socio-political context, with multiplicity of culture, diversity of languages and differentiated needs and means, the importance of local government in fostering the needed national consciousness, unity and relative uniformity as well as preservation of peculiar diversities cannot be over-emphasized. Central to the creation of local government, however, is its ability to facilitate an avenue through which government and the people intermix, relate and more quickly than any other means resolve or dissolve issues that may have heated the system. Local government has been perceived as a panacea for the diverse problems of the diverse people with diverse culture. The importance of local government in enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of service delivery no doubt contributed to the rapid creation of many local governments following the adoption of 1979 constitution. Even today, there are still agitations for the creation of additional local governments.
One
of the constraints of local government autonomy is in the area of authority
relationship. According to Okoli (1995) authority relationship is the pattern
of relationship that will determine whether what obtains is local government or
local administration in the first place. Decree No. 15 clearly specifies the
constitutional and legal status of local government. Without prejudice to
section 10 of the Decree, section 1 (3,4,5 and 6) make the state government a
watch-dog of the activities of the local government. For instance, section 1
(3) provides as follows. the local government are shall be the only unit in respect of which the government of a state is empowered to establish an authority for the purpose of local government.
Section (14) states that without
prejudice to the provisions of subsection (3) of this section, the government
of a state may, by Edict or law, create for any local government area in its
state up to a maximum of 7 development areas having regard to such factors as
common historical and traditional ties, geographical contiguity and administrative
expedience. Section 1(5) stated; subject to subsection (2) of this section, the
person authorized by law to prescribe the area over which a local government
may exercise authority shall define such area as clearly as practicable and in
conformity with the provision of schedule 1 to this Decree. Thus, in spite of
the legal and constitutional provisions, local governments vis-à-vis the
federal and state governments, in spite of constitutional provisions, is a
reality of disturbing importance. These belittling attitudinal relationships of
the higher level governments to the local governments actually, to a degree erode
local governments’ autonomy. Interactions are bound to be skewed against the
local governments.
In
addition, the financial relationship of local government appear to be more of
their making as well as those of the state governments. Section 1 (8, 9 and 10)
of the decree subordinates the financial fortunes of the local government to
the full glare and sometimes, scrutiny of the state government. Even though the
statutory allocations due to the local government councils are paid directly to
them, the mere fact that both the national and states assemblies shall, in
accordance with provisions of section 1 (9) and (b), make provisions for statutory
allocations of public revenue to the local governments within the state is a
limiting factor.
Another
factor responsible for lack of local
government autonomy is the personnel relationship. Local governments in Nigeria face a
number of personnel problems which militate against the effective performance
of their functions. According to Ezeani (2004) one such problems is the
politicization of recruitment, selection and placement. This problem has been
noted by Onah (1995) for instance, since the inception of democratic local
government system in the former eastern region of Nigeria in 1950, early
recruitment into the local government service were mainly “sons of the soil”,
party stalwarts, or relations of counselors. As Orewa and Adewunmi (1983) rightly
stated, recruitment practices based on patronage, have created problems of
redundancy in local government where stern measures like termination of
appointments and suspension of staff are rarely contemplated.
The
decree recognizes the importance of personnel in any discussions on autonomy.
In section 29, 30, 31, 32 and 33, it provides for the existence and functions
of the local government service commission. The main function of a local
government service commission shall include the following:
- to set up general and uniform
guidelines for appointments, promotions, and discipline,
- to monitor the activities of each
local government to ensure that the guidelines are strictly and uniformly
adhered to; and
- to serve as a review body for all
petitions from local governments in respect of appointments, promotions and
discipline.
In the view of Okoli (1995) there is
no doubt that; in reality, state governors, through the appointment of the
members of the members of the local government service commission as earlier
indicated, indirectly control certain categories of the local government staff.
Under such conditions the loyalties of such staff are a suspect, after all he
who pays the piper dictates the tune.
Another factor to consider is the
political and ecological relationship of local government. Decree No 15 makes
provisions for this element of autonomy in its specification of the functions
of local government councils. The sources of local government revenue as
contained in section 27 of the decree. Of course, the actualization of the
sources of revenue depends on the capability of the local government council.
And this capability is mediated by the political and ecological relationships.
However, the continued cries by the various local governments in all spheres of
their operations show that all is not well with their autonomy.
Also,
the draft constitution of 1995 further contradicted the autonomy of the local
government as a meaningful tier of government. By the term “tier” as used in
this context means a set of local governments with their own identify, powers
and sources of revenue established under state legislation, and with functions
for which they are responsible to the state. It is contained in section 7;
subsection 10 of the draft constitution of 1995 which state as follows;
subject to the provision of this constitution, the
executive power of a local government shall be invested in the chairman of that
local government council, and may subject as a fore-said, to the provisions of
any law made by the house of assembly of the state within whose boundaries thee
local government area is situated and bye-law made by the local government
council, be exercised by either directly or through the vice-chairman of
supervisory or officials in the service of the local government.
Onyishi and Obi (2004) are of the
view that the above cited provision of the constitution would portend
intractable intergovernmental problems in which the local government is
obviously the victim.
This
study examines local government autonomy in Nigeria with particular reference
to Imo state. In the light of the above, this work is set to address the
following questions;
- To what extent does the operation of the state-local government joint account promote autonomy of local government in Imo State?
- To what extent has the nature of personnel relationship promoted the autonomy of local governments in Imo State?
- What measures can be adopted to ensure local government autonomy in Imo State and Nigeria?
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AUTONOMY IN NIGERIA A STUDY OF IMO STATE LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM 1976 2013
