CHAPTER ONE
OVERVIEW OF THE ECOWAS SECURITY SYSTEM
Introduction
This chapter provides a general prelude to the study. It begins with an overview of ECOWAS’ formation, its main aim, and assumption of regional security mandate, as well as a summary of the militant situation in West Africa. The remaining sections outline the research problem, aim and objectives, and significance of the study.
Background to ECOWAS’ Formation
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is a 15-member supra-state organization formed in 1975 to promote economic integration, growth and development in West Africa. More importantly, it must be noted, the official launch of the ECOWAS on May 28, 1975, was a climax of several past attempts at regional economic integration traceable to the late 1950s (Frempong, 1999). This latter assertion is exemplified by the April 1959 Conakry Declaration of the Ghana-Guinea Union; the 1959 Council of Accord formed by Cote d’Ivoire, Benin, Burkina Faso and Niger (Togo joined in 1966); the 1972 Economic Community of West Africa (ECWA) by Cote d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal with the CFA Franc as its official currency; and the Mano River Union (MRU) formed by Liberia and Sierra Leone in 1973 (joined later by Guinea and Cote d’Ivoire) to leverage on the river resources for development (ECOWAS Commission, 2015a).
One version of the integration project in West Africa credits William Tubman of Liberia as the first to have begun a campaign for an all-inclusive economic integration project in the 1960s. In 1964, Tubman urged his West African compatriots to establish a single economic bloc to stimulate regional economic growth and development. His initiative resulted in a rather short-lived economic community arrangement signed by
Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone in 1965 (Zagaris, 1987). Another version points to the separate efforts by Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Tafewo Balewa of Nigeria in the 1960s (marked largely by rivalry towards each other owing to their opposing positions on the nature such integration should take). While Nkrumah was championing a political union of Africa, Balewa called for a functional regional cooperation. Balewa’s position was based on the idea that economic integration should precede a political union, in a bottom-up approach, commencing at the regional level, and to proceed in phases through functional cooperation and coordination towards a common market (Frempong, 1999; Olatunde, 1980).
The two Anglophone leaders’ rivalry enabled their Francophone counterparts to forge exclusive unity. By 1966, when Nkrumah was overthrown and Balewa deceased, the Anglophone bloc got the chance to unite, but Nigeria’s civil (Biafra) war fought between 1967 and 1970 would cause a further delay. It is not a gainsaying that Nigeria played a pivotal role in realizing the region’s economic integration agenda. Nigeria’s regional leadership reflects its new military leader’s efforts in the 1970s towards the creation of the ECOWAS. After the Biafra war, General Yakubu Gowon renewed the calls for regional cooperation but faced opposition from the Francophone bloc led by Cote d’Ivoire under the influence of France. Even though often blown out of proportion, arguably, there has historically been a raging antagonism between the Anglophone and Francophone blocs (Engel and Jouanjean, 2015; Bossuyt, 2016).
On its part, fearing Nigeria’s domination in any West African integration scheme, France supported Cote d’Ivoire’s hostility towards Nigeria. In a February-March 1971 tour in most of the former French colonies, President Pompidou warned against Nigeria’s domination and urged them to harmonize their efforts to counter balance
the heavy weight of Nigeria. This resulted in the West African Economic Community’s (CEAO) creation in 1973 (Frempong, 1999; Olatunde, 1980). In the words of Engel and Jouanjean (2015), France perceived Nigeria as a major threat to its chasse gardée (preserve), French West Africa, as it made use of Cote d’Ivoire’s economic might and Senegal’s cultural heritage. They observed that France used Cote d’Ivoire to break up Nigeria in the Biafra War (see Bamfo, 2013).
According to Frempong (1999), this would rather ginger, other than frustrate, Nigeria into aggressive diplomacy to approach most countries in the region to canvas for support towards the economic integration agenda. This was followed with Lagos’ liberal dispensation of funds as inducement for support and loyalty. The result was the formation of the joint Nigeria-Togo Commission in 1972 to serve as the nucleus around which a full regional economic community would evolve. This Commission was significant for two main reasons: first, it demystified the widely held mystique that linguistic differences constituted an overarching impediment to trade and economic integration in the region; second, it showed that a relatively small and poor country could engage in economically rewarding partnership with a large and relatively prosperous country. But it must be noted that Togo is not a core Francophone country and so this move did not come as a surprise (Frempong, 1999: 120; ECOWAS Commission, 2015a; Zagaris, 1987).
By 1973, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Gambia and Liberia had joined the Commission. But for Guinea, the core Francophone neighbours were reluctant to join. It took military takeovers in Benin and Niger before they were joined to the agenda. Cote d’Ivoire, Senegal, Burkina Faso, and Mauritania remained opposed to Gowon’s proposed economic community agenda; and rather reluctantly declared their support for same
at the launch of the ECOWAS in 1975. As Frempong (1999: 121) observed, for fear of being left behind, and Nigeria’s subsequent leadership in the region, they eventually declared their support for the ECOWAS but still kept the CEAO intact (see also ECOWAS Commission, 2015a).
Perhaps, West African states’ major challenge remains the persistent interference from external actors in protecting their geostrategic interests. This was especially glaring during the Cold War era as France, for example, adopted a divide and rule tactic to protect its interests in West Africa by establishing defence pacts, economic and common monetary policy with its former colonies. The West African Economic and Monetary Union’s (WAEMU) creation, and the existence and survival of a common monetary union are the brain-child of France. The uneasy coexistence of ECOWAS and WAEMU, with partly overlapping mandates and membership, also illustrate the conflicting historical paths masterminded largely by France in West Africa (Vanheukelom, 2017; Frempong, 1999). This reflects the wider geopolitical processes in the region marked by power struggles between the Francophonese and the Agnlophonese as manifested by the use of WAEMU and similar tools to checkmate Nigeria’s dominance in the region. Staniland (1987) captured France’s bond with its former colonies succinctly:
[M]inisters of French-speaking African countries made an average of 2,000 visits to Paris annually. Again, between 1960 and 1978, Francophone countries and French presidents held 280 meetings. Presidents de Gaulle, Pompidou, and Giscard d’Estaing made 32 state visits to Africa. Cote d’Ivoire hosted over 50,000 French citizens, with Senegal hosting over 20,000. Moreover, Paris kept military bases and defence pacts with its West African allies (Bamfo, 2013: 15).
Considering the nature of this historical (geopolitical) path, including cultural, administrative, legal and socio-economic diversities among the Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone countries, it was difficult, if not impossible, to forge any political union or security alliance in West Africa. Any effective regional integration scheme had to proceed from a functional economic union as the basis for future integration agenda that traversed the sovereignty of member states. Thus, the 1975 founding treaty of the ECOWAS focused solely on creating an economic union as a nucleus for continental common market. So, its regional security scheme was only conceived as a necessity to address the myriads of security dilemmas the region confronts (Vanheukelom, 2017; Caparini, 2015; Aning, 1999; Jaye and Amadi, n.d.).
Overview of Collective Security Scheme in West Africa
The enormity of security complexities in West Africa on economic integration, growth and development was downplayed when ECOWAS was formed in 1975. However, starting from 1978, the various structural hiccups drummed home the need to adopt a robust collective peace and defence scheme in the region. Both inter and intrastate peace and stability was conceived as preconditions for realizing its primary objectives. This began in the form of protocols incorporated into the 1975 treaty to promote peace and defence in the region. However, it is worth noting that Cold War geopolitics among countries in West Africa impeded ECOWAS’ ability to forge any comprehensive and robust collective security scheme. The provisions in the legal instruments were not implemented until the 1990s following the implosion of intractable civil wars in the region (ECOWAS Commission, 2015a; ICG, 2016).
The changing post-Cold War trends, the limitations, setbacks and lessons from ECOMOG’s earlier interventions, among others, would force ECOWAS to revise its 1975 treaty. This culminated in adoption of the 1993 revised treaty. Again, in 1999
the Mechanism was adopted as the main legal document to leverage peace and stability in the region. The Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance was also signed in December 2001 to address the root causes of conflicts in the region and to improve good governance and multiparty democracy. Furthermore, the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) was approved in January 2008 to provide roadmaps for sustained implementation of these two protocols (Frempong, 1999; ECPF, 2008; Elowson and McDermott, 2010; ECTS, 2013; Adetula, 2015).
Normatively, the current scheme enhances ECOWAS’ reputation as a matured security community in Africa. Again, as some countries struggle to deal with the rising militant crises in the region, many deem ECOWAS’ leadership in the crusade against militancy as crucial. However, it must be noted that the Mechanism and similar instruments only make passing thoughts about the specific issue of militancy. The reason, perhaps, being that militancy did not constitute a major security threat in the region prior to the 21st Century. However, West Africa is currently engulfed in a – dramatic surge in activities of both domestic and international militant groups (Ewi, 2012; Haysom, 2014; Caparini, 2015). This would inform the Authority of Heads of State and Government’s adoption of the ECOWAS Counter Terrorism Strategy (ECTS) in 2013 to address the militant situation across the region.
