A CRITIQUE OF WIREDU’S CONCEPT OF TRUTH PROJECT TOPICS

A CRITIQUE OF WIREDU’S CONCEPT OF TRUTH

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Title page
Certification
Dedication
Acknowledgements
Table of contents
Abstract
CHAPTER ONE
1.0 Theories of Truth

The nature and traditional theories of truth

The semantic theory of truth…………………………4

The correspondence theory of truthi………………………………………………..6
The coherence theory of truthi…………………………………………………………8
The pragmatic theory of truthi………………………………………………………12
End Notes…………………………………………………………………………………..16
CHAPTER TWO
2.0 Correspondence Theory of Truth…………………………………………………..18
2.1 Wiredu’s critiques of the correspondence theory of truthi…………………..18
2.2 General thesis………………………………………………………………………………21
2.3 Truthi as opinion…………………………………………………………………………..25
End Notes………………………………………………………………………………..34

CHAPTER THREE
3.0 Truthi as Opnion……………………………………………………………………………36
3.1 Objections and counter objections to truth as opinion……………………….37
3.2 P.O Bodunrin……………………………………………………………………………….39
3.3 Abdul Ghaniyi Bello…………………………………………………………………….42
3.4 Wiredu’s replies to critics……………………………………………………………..44
End Notes…………………………………………………………………………………..46
CHAPTER FOUR: Evaluation and Conclusion
4.1 An evaluation of Wiredu’s thesis……………………………………………………47
4.2 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………..55
End Notes…………………………………………………………………………………….58
Bibliography………………………………………………………………………………..59
ABSTRACT
Wiredu’s recent significant contribution to epistemology reviews the relationship between knowledge, truthi and existence.
In this theory Kwasi Wiredu attempts to refute the supposition that truthi is a relation the supposition that truthi is a relation between statements about the world and the world itself. He argues against objectivist claims to knowledge i.e, that knowledge is of a thing as it is in itself and that appearance is different from opinion.
Wiredu argues against the attempts to distinguish between truthi of opinion and truth of knowledge and the position by which Wiredu institutes his thesis is a claim that “Truthi is an opinion”. He calls this a special case of general proposition that has to be apprehended.
In this essay, my main contention is that Kwasi Wiredu is identifying truthi with opinion, fails to give a truei account of human reality because his thesis discards completely the distinction that should be obtained between truth and opinion, thereby making falsehood impossible, and truthi subjective.

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